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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Public Service Commission of Utah (hereinafter the 
"Commission") failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) (1985) in detariffing mobile radio service and 
exempting the suppliers of such services from the requirement of 
seeking prior approval for rate changes. Respondents, the 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company and U.S. West 
NewVector Group, Inc., argue that the Commission satisfied the 
requirements of S 54-8b-3(2) when it determined that named 
factors were irrelevant, and that presentation of evidence 
regarding those factors was unnecessary. This interpretation of 
the statutory requirements is wholly without merit. The plain 
language of S 54-8b-3(2) expressly states that the factors 
enumerated therein are "relevant" — it is not the Commission's 
task to redetermine that issue. Rather, the Commission is to 
consider the enumerated factors of Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) 
based on competent, admissible evidence -- a task it cannot 
accomplish without requiring presentation of evidence on those 
factors. 
1 The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company and U.S. 
West NewVector Group, Inc. will hereinafter be referred to 
respectively as "Mountain Bell" and "NewVector", or collectively 
as "Respondents", since they have filed a joint brief in this 
case. NewVector is actually an intervenor in this appeal. 
The Commission's Finding of Fact, Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 14f 15 and 16 are not factually supported by the 
record, and cannot withstand scrutiny under the appropriate 
standard of review. Respondents erroneously conclude that each 
of the findings attacked by Petitioner David Williams dba Indus-
trial Communications ("Williams") should be upheld if supported 
by "any evidence whatsoever." The contested findings of the 
Commission actually contain questions of basic fact, ultimate 
fact, or both, and conclusions of law. While the Commission's 
findings on basic facts might be examined under the "any evidence 
whatsoever" standard, application of the law to those facts is to 
be reviewed by this Court under the intermediate standard of 
"reasonableness or rationality." In this case the Commission's 
findings of fact fail to withstand scrutiny under this intermedi-
ate standard of review. 
Finally, the Commission's findings are not supported by 
a residuum of legally competent evidence admissible in a court of 
law. In an attempt to overcome their witnesses' reliance on 
clear hearsay as the basis for their testimony before the Commis-
sion, Respondents cite for the first time exceptions to the 
hearsay rule applicable to expert witnesses. They then argue 
that the witnesses not qualified as experts could have been so 
qualified, and that the hearsay riddled testimony was properly 
allowed. Since the testimony of each of Respondents' witnesses 
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was based on hearsay and contained material facts of which they 
had no personal knowledge, the findings of the Commission were 
not supported by a residuum of legally competent evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN, S 54-8b-3(2). 
Respondents apparently misunderstand, and as a result, 
misconstrue Williams' argument in their opposing brief. Respon-
dents argue that Williams' only specific complaint is that the 
Commission did not consider the cost of providing mobile tele-
phone service as required by Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) (i) . 
(See Brief of Respondents at 8) (hereinafter "Br. Resp."). In 
fact, Williams' opening brief clearly states that the 
Commission's failure to consider "relevant factor" (i), "the cost 
of providing such service" is merely an example of one of the 
factors which the Commission failed to consider. (See Brief of 
Petitioner at 9, 13-14) (hereinafter "Br. Pet."). While the 
Commission may have considered some evidence (albeit incompetent) 
on a few of the factors listed in S 54-8b-3(2), it failed to 
require any evidence whatsoever on many of them. Further exam-
ples of factors as to which the Commission failed to require 
presentation of competent evidence include, among others: (d) the 
existence of other providers to make functionally equivalent 
services readily available at competitive rates, terms and 
conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on the regulated revenue 
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requirements of the telecommunications corporation requesting an 
exemption; and (j) the economic impact on existing telecommunica-
tions corporations. Williams maintains that the Commission must 
consider each of the legislatively specified factors. Failure to 
do so constitutes reversible error. 
A. The Commission is Without Authority to 
Alter or Declare Irrelevant the Require-
ments of S 54-8b-3(2) Established by the 
Legislature. 
U.C.A. S 54-8b-3(2) states in relevant part: 
. . . In determining whether to exempt any 
telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service from any require-
ment of this title, the commission shall 
consider all relevant factors including, but 
not limited to: (a) the number of other 
providers offering similar services; (b) the 
interstate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the telecommuni-
cations corporation requesting an exemption; 
(c) the intrastate market power and market 
share of other providers; (d) the existence 
of other providers to make functionally 
equivalent services readily available at 
competitive rates, terms, and conditions; (e) 
the effect of exemption on the regulated 
revenue requirements of the telecommunica-
tions corporation requesting an exemption; 
(f) the ease of entry of other providers into 
the marketplace; (g) the overall impact of 
exemption on the public interest; (h) the 
integrity of all service providers in the 
proposed market; (i) the cost of providing 
such service; (j) the economic impact on 
existing telecommunication corporations; and 
(k) whether competition will promote the 
provision of adequate services at just and 
reasonable rates. (Emphasis added). 
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In its Report and Order and in their brief, the Commis-
sion and Respondents argue that the Commission satisfies the 
requirements of S 54-8b-3(2) when it considers whether a named 
factor is relevant to an issue before the Commission, or that 
presentation of evidence regarding a specific factor is not 
necessary, (See R. 522-23; Br. Resp. 10-11.) This argument 
completely ignores the fact that the Legislature has already 
determined that the factors listed in S 54-8b-3(2) are relevant 
and are to be considered by the Commission. The Legislature 
stated that "the Commission shall consider all relevant factors 
including, but not limited to: . . . " factors (a) through (k) . 
The Commission is totally without legislative authority to 
rewrite the statutory requirements of S 54-8b-3(2) by declaring 
"irrelevant" the factors which the Legislature has expressly 
deemed relevant and commanded the Commission to consider. 
Respondents1 argument that "[t]he Commission interpreted 
S 54-8b-3(2) to mean that it must consider the enumerated issues 
in reaching its decision, but that it did not need to receive 
specific evidence on each enumerated factor" reduces the manda-
tory language of S 54-8b-3(2) and factors (a) - (k) to a nullity. 
(Br. Resp. 11-12.) 
Further, Respondents' argument that requiring the 
Commission to consider evidence on each of the enumerated factors 
in S 54-8b-3(2) would "eliminate the Commission's power, as 
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permitted by this Court, to use its technical sophistication to 
determine whether a factor is relevant or determinative in a 
given case" is without merit. (Br. Resp. 13.) The Legislature, 
in enacting S 54-8b-3(2), established a clear and concise proce-
dure to be followed by the Commission in determining whether to 
exempt any telecommunications corporation or any public telecom-
munications service from any requirement of Title 54. Requiring 
the Commission to follow the Legislature's procedure does not 
"eliminate the Commission's power" but rather establishes the 
parameters within which the Commission may properly exercise its 
power. 
B. The Commission Erred by Not Requiring 
Evidence Relevant to the Factors Listed 
in S 54-8b-3(2). 
Respondents argue that the Commission adequately 
considered the cost of providing mobile telephone service. (See 
Br. Resp. 13-15.) However, Respondents do not cite (nor can 
they) any portion of the record containing any evidence regarding 
specific cost data. Instead, Respondents argue that "counsel for 
[Williams] requested information concerning, not Mountain Bell's 
2 
mobile telephone cost, but its profitability." (Br. Resp, 15 
2 Respondents argument that Williams was reluctant to pursue 
the issue of cost on cross-examination due to a concern that it 
might be called upon to respond in kind (Br. Resp. 16) is incor-
rect and wholly unsupported by the record. 
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citing R. 98.) Respondents, in making this argument, failed to 
recognize three things: First, the burden is upon Mountain Bell, 
as the applicant before the Commission, to provide evidence 
concerning the factors listed in S 54-8b-3(2), and not upon 
Williams to demand such evidence on cross examination. Second, 
Industrial's request for profitability data necessarily included 
a request for cost data, since profitability evidence would 
require such a showing. Finally, profitability is another 
enumerated factor, independent of cost, as to which the Commis-
sion failed to require, and Mountain Bell failed to offer, any 
evidence. Utah Code Ann, S 54-8b-3(2)(e). 
II. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16 ARE NOT 
FACTUALLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
Respondents argue that this Court's opinion in Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commis-
sion 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) ["Wexpro II"] requires that this 
Court review each of the Commission's contested findings of fact 
under the "any evidence whatsoever" standard. In fact, Wexpro II 
supports Williams' argument that the Commission's findings of 
fact in this case should be scrutinized under an intermediate 
"substantial evidence" or "reasonableness or rationality" stand-
ard. 
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A. The Appropriate Standard of Review of 
the Contested Findings of Fact in this 
Case is "Reasonableness or Rationality." 
In Wexpro II, this Court established that in reviewing 
the Commission's interpretations of general questions of law, the 
standard to be applied is "correction of error." Id. at 608. 
Under this standard, no deference is given to the expertise of 
the Commission. Id. At the other end of the spectrum, Wexpro II 
establishes that "[t]he greatest degree of deference is extended 
to the Commission's findings on questions of basic fact which do 
not include 'ultimate facts' and the application of legal rules 
to basic facts . . . " id. (parenthesis omitted). 
The standard to be applied in this case was described 
by the Court as follows: 
Between the foregoing extremes of no defer-
ence on questions of general law and the 
greatest deference on questions of basic fact 
are a variety of issues on which Commission 
decisions are entitled to weight, but are 
subject to judicial review to assure that 
they fall within the limits of reasonableness 
or rationality. The existence of this 
intermediate category of issues is a prag-
matic concern -- borne of experience — that 
the terms law and fact and the extent of 
judicial review associated with them have not 
provided the analytical framework to explain 
the various types of review actually exer-
cised by the courts. As Judge Henry Friendly 
has said, 'The common approach seeking to 
dichotomize all decisions as either "law" or 
"fact" is too simplistic' (citation 
omitted). . . [P]ractical experience with 
judicial review has unquestionably identified 
a major category of administrative decisions 
on which reviewing courts exercise a scope of 
review more extensive than when reviewing 
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agency findings on questions of basic fact, 
but less extensive than when reviewing to 
correct error in agency decisions on ques-
tions of general law. (citation omitted). 
A variety of different issues are governed by 
this intermediate standard. Most notably, 
they include what has been described as 
'mixed questions of law and fact1 or the 
'application' of the findings of basic facts 
(e.g., what happened) to the legal rules 
governing the case. . . . 
Also among these intermediate issues are the 
Commission's decisions on what can be called 
questions of "special law". These are the 
Commission's interpretations of the operative 
provisions of the statutory law it is empow-
ered to administer, especially those general-
ized terms that bespeak a legislative intent 
to delegate their interpretation to the 
responsible agency. . . . [0]n issues of 
special law, as with other issues under this 
heading, the decision of the Commission is 
subject to judicial review under the standard 
lucidated here. 
The degree of deference extended to the 
decisions of the Commission on these interme-
diate types of issues has been given various 
expressions, but all are variations of the 
idea that the Commission's decisions must 
fall within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality. As used in this context, the 
words 'arbitrary and capricious' mean no more 
than this. 
The test of rationality may be simply a 
matter of logic or completeness, such as when 
the question is whether the Commission's 
findings of fact support its conclusion, 
(citing Mountain States Legal Foundation v. 
Utah Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 
1047, 1057 (1981)). 
658 P.2d at 609-11 (emphasis added). 
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In their brief, Respondents are apparently taking the 
position that the challenged findings are all basic findings of 
fact. (Br. Resp. 20.) In reality, each of the challenged 
findings of fact contain basic facts, ultimate facts, or both, 
and represent an analysis by the Commission of these facts within 
the framework of Utah Code Ann, S 54-8b-3(2). As such, each of 
the contested findings of fact represents a "mixed question of 
law and fact" as explained in Wexpro II. Thus, under this 
Court's decision in Wexpro II, each of the contested findings of 
fact is to be examined under an intermediate standard of review 
requiring that "the Commission's decisions must fall within the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality." 658 P.2d at 610. 
Respondents' argument that each of the contested findings of fact 
is to be reviewed under the standard of "evidence of any sub-
stance whatever" is simply without merit. 
B. The Commission's Findings Fail to With-
stand Scrutiny Under the Appropriate 
Standard of Review. 
As this Court recognized in Wexpro II, the intermediate 
standard of review "has been given various expressions, but all 
are variations of the idea that the Commission's decisions must 
fall within the limits of reasonableness or rationality." 658 
P.2d at 610. One of the expressions of the intermediate standard 
of review referred to in Wexpro II is contained in Mountain 
States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, 636 
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P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), cited in Williams' opening brief. Accord-
ing to the Court in that case, 
For this court to sustain an order, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed to 
demonstrate that the Commission has properly 
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and 
has properly applied the governing rules of 
law to those findings. Ultimate findings as 
to reasonableness and discrimination must be 
sustained if there are adequate subordinate 
findings to support them, and there is 
substantial evidence to support the findings, 
636 P.2d at 1052. Under this "substantial evidence" expression 
of the intermediate standard of review, the Commission's findings 
of fact in this case do not withstand scrutiny. As detailed in 
Williams' original brief, Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 14, 15 and 16 are unsupported by "substantial evidence" 
and are erroneous as a matter of law. (Br. Pet. 18-23.) 
Respondents argue that the Commission's finding that 
various providers offer functionally equivalent mobile telephone 
service is supported by the evidence (Br. Resp. 20), and that 
Williams misinterprets S 54-8b-3(2)(d) because that section 
"obviously contemplates that functionally equivalent services 
could be provided at non-competitive rates, terms and condi-
tions." (Br. Resp. 21.) Respondents fail to explain how an 
equivalent service could be "equivalent" without being offered at 
competitive rates, terms and conditions. Williams asserts that 
any service offered at non-competitive rates, dissimilar terms 
and dissimilar conditions is, by definition, not an "equivalent 
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service." In addition, Respondents argue that "substantial 
evidence in the record" indicates that functionally equivalent 
services are available, but fail to identify that evidence. (Br. 
Resp. 21.) In fact, the only evidence in the record which could 
even arguably be relevant to the question of functionally equiva-
lent services is based on hearsay, and as such cannot be the sole 
basis supporting a finding. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY A RESIDUUM OF LEGALLY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
In Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 
P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959), this Court established that Commis-
sion findings of fact cannot be based solely upon hearsay, but 
must be "'supported by a residuum of legal evidence competent in 
a court of law.f" Id. quoting Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial 
Comm. , 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376, 377 (1942), and cases cited 
therein. See also, Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 
486 (Utah 1981). In other words, the Commission's findings can 
only be upheld on judicial review if they are based on a residumm 
or balance of competent evidence above and beyond the hearsay 
testimony presented. 
In an effort to overcome the implications of this rule, 
Respondents assert that "Messrs. Murphy and Capshaw and Dr. 
Compton were qualified as experts and could have been formally so 
qualified had Williams objected to their opinion testimony on the 
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ground that they were not experts." (Br. Resp. 35.) Counsel for 
Williams in fact made numerous objections to the admissibility of 
the hearsay testimony offered. (R. 62, 83-84, 94, 95, 102, 106, 
107, 117.) Division witnesses Robert Capshaw and George R. 
Compton admitted during cross-examination before the Commission 
that they relied upon documents provide by Mr. Murphy, for which 
there was no foundation whatsoever, in preparing their testimony 
and formulating their opinions. (R. at 160, 204.) Despite the 
numerous objections made by Williams' counsel, counsel for 
Respondents did not attempt to qualify the witnesses as experts. 
Instead, Respondents have waited until this late date to assert 
that the hearsay testimony offered by the witnesses was competent 
and admissible as the proper basis for expert opinions. Respon-
dents, not Williams (who raised proper hearsay objections) 
assumes the risk of error when the Commission erroneously allows 
and considers inadmissible evidence and bases its finding 
thereon. The time to cure evidentiary errors is now past. 
In summary, the testimony offered by each of the 
witnesses for the Respondents constituted hearsay and was inad-
missible. Thus, the Commission's findings are unsupported by a 
residuum of competent evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 770 
P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), this Court declared that the Commission is 
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bound by the statutory directives under which it acts, and cannot 
ignore the requirements of those statutes when exempting telecom-
munications services from regulation. A fortiori, the Commission 
cannot circumvent the legislatively pronounced scheme of Utah 
Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) by declaring its mandated considerations 
irrelevant. For this reason, and for others stated above and in 
Williams' opening brief, the Report and Order issued by the 
Commission in consolidated case nos. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19 
should be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this IO&- day of December, 
1987. 
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